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Drawing on a unique farm level panel data set with 37,409 observations and employing a 
matching estimator, this paper analyses how farm access to credit affects farm input 
allocation and farm efficiency in the CEE transition countries. We find that farms are 
asymmetrically credit constrained between inputs. The use of variable inputs and capital 
investment increases up to 2.3% and 29%, respectively, per 1000 EUR of additional 
credit. Our estimates suggest also that farm access to credit increases the total factor 
productivity up to 1.9% per 1000 EUR of additional credit, indicating that an improved 
access to credit results in adjusting the relative input intensities on farms. This finding is 
further supported by a negative effect of better access to credit on labour, suggesting that 
these two are substitutes. Interestingly, farms are found not to be credit constrained with 
respect to land.  
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Access to Credit, Factor Allocation and Farm Productivity: 
Evidence From the CEE Transition Economies 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The shortage of credit has been identified as a crucial factor determining farm 
performance and development. Budget constraint has been found to be an important 
factor limiting farms’ use of inputs not only in developing countries but also in developed 
economies (Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar 1997; Heltberg 1998; Lee and Chambers, 
1986; Färe, Grosskopf and Lee, 1990; Blancard et al., 2006). Due to a series of transition-
related problems this problem has been especially acute within the Central and Eastern 
European agricultural sector (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; OECD, 1999; OECD, 2001; Dries 
and Swinnen 2004).   
The main focus of the emerging literature on agricultural credit in transition countries are 
determinants of farm access to credit (Bezemer, 2002; Davis et al., 2003; Petrick and 
Latruffe, 2003; Latruffe et al., 2008). Considerably less attention has been paid to the 
relationship between credit constraint and farms’ behaviour such as farms’ input choices 
and productivity. Notable exceptions include Dries and Swinnen (2004) or Latruffe 
(2005). The fact that there are only few studies looking at the relationship between a 
credit constraint and farms’ behaviour can be explained by a lack of the necessary micro-
data for addressing the identification and endogeneity issues. The complexity of 
imperfections of rural credit markets makes it extremely difficult to test which farms are 
credit constrained, by how much, and what impact this may have on farm behaviour. This 
is especially difficult with a cross-section regressions since the estimated correlations 
may reflect an omitted variable or reverse causation problems. We try to address these 
issues by taking advantage of an extensive Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
data set on transition countries as well as semi-parametric methods.  
The objective of the paper is to analyse how farm production and input use (land, variable 
inputs, labour, and capital) is related to farm access to credit in the CEE transition   3
countries. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to exploit a harmonised farm-
level data to investigate the importance of access to credit for farm performance in the 
whole CEE region. In contrast to the existing studies, which usually are for single 
countries, we use a harmonised farm level panel data set for eight CEE transition 
countries. This allows us to investigate the effect of access to credit not only in particular 
countries, but also in the region as a whole. This is important because, notwithstanding 
the country-specific issues, all transition countries faced a number of common problems 
related to local credit markets: from lack of skilled and experienced banking staff, lack of 
accountancy and bookkeeping system at farm level, and politically rather than 
economically motivated asset (re)distribution in the beginning of the 1990s, to farms’ 
accumulated debts and incomplete property rights to land that reduced the suitability of 
land as collateral (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; OECD 1999; OECD, 2001).  
The large size of the FADN data set has an additional advantage. It allows us to employ a 
semi-parametric estimator based on the propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). Using more than 37,409 observations assures that the loss in efficiency of 
semi-parametric estimates, as compared to parametric ones, is not a problem. This is 
important for at least two reasons. First, applying a semi-parametric propensity score 
matching (PSM) estimator allows us to control for any heterogeneity in the relationship 
between farm performance and their observable characteristics (in particular access to 
credit). Second, matching estimators are robust in situations where farms having access to 
credit systematically differ from those that do not.  
The conceptual framework of our study is based on Blancard et al. (2006). In our model 
the availability of credit is determined by several factors, as farms have various options 
how to access financial resources. First, financial resources are channelled to agricultural 
sector through vertical integration. The recent expansion of vertical integration and 
contracting were shown to be an important source of credit to farms in the CEE (Dries 
and Swinnen 2004; Gorton and White, 2007; Swinnen, 2007). Second, governments in 
many countries intervene in agricultural markets with agricultural support policies. Even 
though agricultural support measures may not be intended to directly improve farm 
access to credit, they may alleviate farms’ budget constraint by increasing farms’ cash   4
flow and thus increasing their credit-worthiness (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Moreover, 
the interaction of rural financial structures and government interventions may lead to 
input specific adjustments. For example, agricultural subsidies may increase short-run 
credit which is needed to finance variable inputs rather than long-run credit which is 
needed for fixed inputs (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Third, in the presence of costly 
contract enforcement and asymmetric information, the collateral may represent an 
important instrument in securing farms' access to credit (Bester, 1985; Ghosh, 
Mookherjee, and Ray, 2000). The use of collateral for securing credit is in turn 
conditional on the functioning of rural land markets (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). 
Underdeveloped land markets limit the possibility to use land as collateral, which reduces 
farm access to credit affecting particularly the long-run possibilities to finance fixed input 
purchases. Finally, factors such as rural insurance markets and informal rural institutions 
directly or indirectly may affect farm credit, for example, by affecting, among others, the 
risk level of agricultural production, loan guarantee options, and income volatility. 
The theoretical model offers two testable hypotheses for farm adjustments in input use 
and output supply. The first hypothesis says that with perfect credit markets the source of 
financing is irrelevant, hence a farm access to credit will neither affect farm input choices 
nor the level of farm output. Hence, we implicitly assume that farm input and 
productivity response to access to credit reflects a farm credit constraint. The second 
hypothesis says that a symmetric credit constraint affects the scale of input use, but not 
the relative input intensities, whereas an asymmetric credit constraint affects both the 
level of input use and the relative factor intensities.
5 A symmetric credit constraint does 
not affect the relative (shadow) prices of inputs. In effect, if farms face symmetric credit 
constraint on all inputs, improved access to credit increases the use of all inputs 
(Blancard et al., 2006). On the other hand, an asymmetric credit constraint affects both 
the relative marginal value product of inputs as well as the scale of input use (Lee and 
Chambers, 1986; Färe, Grosskopf and Lee, 1990). As a result, it will affect both the level 
                                                 
5 We distinguish between a short-run and long-run credit constraint. A symmetric credit constraint implies 
that there is no differentiation between credit rationing related to operational expenses and long-run 
investments. An asymmetric credit constraint instead, describes the situation where a farm is differently 
constrained in its access to a short-run and a long-run credit. Note that this results in differentiated farm 
access to variable and fixed inputs, respectively (see further).   5
of input use and the relative factor intensities. More credit constrained inputs will be 
substituted for less credit constrained inputs. 
Our results have important policy implications, as in the CEE transition countries farms 
receive a substantial amount of support from the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
First, farms are granted direct payments either per hectare or coupled to production. 
Second, farms receive investment support from the EU Rural Development Polices. Our 
study examines which farm inputs are particularly credit constrained, and hence indicates 
what kind of support measures might be particularly efficient for policy interventions for 
alleviating farm credit problems in the CEE transition economies. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we set out the theoretical 
framework, which identifies the likely impact of the short- and long-run credit constraints 
on farm behaviour and output. Section 3 outlines our econometric strategy, section 4 
presents the data and variables’ definition, whereas section 5 reports the estimation 
results. Finally, section 6 summarises and concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Related literature 
There are three approaches to study the credit constraint.
6 First, farm/household 
profit/utility maximisation models are extensively used to explain the observed patterns 
of farm/household behaviour in the presence of credit constraint (e.g. Lee and Chambers 
1986; Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee 1990; Blancard et. al 2006; Feder 1985; Carter and 
Wiebe, 1990). The second strand of literature are investment models based on the 
Modigliani–Miller’s theorem (Modigliani and Miller 1958), which says that investments 
and asset allocation is independent of the means of financing (debt or equity). These 
studies analyse how the results are affected if the Modigliani–Miller theorem is violated 
(e.g. Mishra, Moss and Erickson 2008). The third approach includes asymmetric 
information models. The risk and asymmetrical information may lead to adverse selection 
and moral hazard and may induce lenders to ration the amount of credit supplied to the 
                                                 
6 For more details on credit rationing in agriculture see summary papers of Barry and Robinson (2001).   6
farm sector, giving rise to a liquidity or credit constraint and impacting farm behaviour 
(e.g. Carter, 1988). 
In the present study we develop a farm profit maximisation model along the first 
approach. Below we briefly review the previous literature that we draw on in our 
theoretical framework. A notable early paper on the farm level effects of the credit 
constraint is Lee and Chambers (1986) who develop a theoretical farm profit 
maximisation model with farms facing constraints on funding short-run farm operating 
expenses. They consider a situation where farm’s total expenditures on variable inputs 
are constrained by a predetermined level of expenditure. Testing the model on the US 
data, Lee and Chambers reject unconstrained farm profit maximisation behaviour, while 
expenditure-constrained profit maximisation could not be rejected. 
Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) adopt a nonparametric alternative to the Lee and 
Chambers (1986) model. Similarly to Lee and Chambers, they compare the behaviour of 
farms with constrained expenditure on variable inputs with that of farms not being credit 
constrained. Specifically, Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee construct a deterministic frontier 
profit function with and without expenditure constraints using a linear programming 
approach. They apply the model to a sample of Californian rice farms. Their results 
indicate that 21% of farms face a binding credit constraint. The average profit loss of the 
expenditure-constrained farms was found to be around 8% of their unconstrained profit. 
Blancard et. al (2006) extend the model of Lee and Chambers (1986) and Färe, 
Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) to differentiate credit constraints between short- and long-run. 
They assume that in the short-run only the expenditures on variable input are constrained, 
while in the long-run the expenditures on all (variable and fixed) inputs are constrained. 
They test the model predictions using a panel of French farmers for the Nord-Pas-de-
Calais region. Blancard et. al find that in the short-run 67% of farms are credit 
constrained, while in the long-run almost all farms are credit constrained. The losses in 
profits due to credit constraint amount on average to 8% and 49% of profits in short- and 
long-run, respectively.   7
The farm model has also been employed to investigate, among others, the productivity 
effect of farm credit constraint (Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1997; Briggeman, Towe 
and Morehart, 2009), the productivity and farm size in developing countries (Feder 1985; 
Carter and Wiebe, 1990), the allocation of farm inputs (Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharyya 
and Kumbhakar, 1996) and distributional effects of agricultural support policies in the 
presence of credit constraint (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen, 2008; Ciaian and Swinnen, 
2009). Except for the latter two studies however, the existing literature does not deal with 
the transition countries.  
2.2 The model 
We build the theoretical framework of the present study on the model of Blancard et. al 
(2006). Accordingly, we consider a representative profit-maximising farm with a 
possibility for input credit constraint. The constant return to scale production technology 
(f(X,Y)) of the representative farm is assumed to be a function of two inputs, X and Y. The 
representative farm’s profits are given by  Y w X w Y X pf Y X − − = Π ) , (  where p is output 
price and  i w  are input prices for i = X, Y. 
Following Blancard et. al (2006), we model imperfect credit market by assuming that the 
credit constrained farm has C  amount of credit available for financing input purchases.
7 
The value of credit C is a predetermined level of expenditure, which cannot be exceeded 
when purchasing inputs:
8 
(1)  C Y w X w Y X ≤ +δ α  
                                                 
7 An important source of credit constraint can arise due to a time lag between agricultural production and 
payment for variable inputs throughout the season. For example, variable inputs are paid at the beginning 
of season whereas the revenue from the sale of production is collected after harvest at the end of the season 
(Feder, 1985; Carter and Wiebe, 1990; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). These characteristics of agricultural 
production require pre-financing of inputs. 
8 The evidence from the literature shows that farm characteristics (e.g. reputation, owned assets, 
profitability) are important determinants of farm credit (e.g. Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Petrick and 
Latruffe, 2003; Latruffe, 2005; Briggeman, Towe and Morehart; 2009). For example, using microdata from 
Poland, Latruffe (2005) finds that farmers with more tangible assets and with more owned land were less 
credit constrained than others. Briggeman Towe and Morehart (2009) find for farm and non-farm sole 
proprietorships in US that the probability of being denied credit is reduced, among others, by net worth, 
income, price of assets, and subsidies.   8
where α  and δ  are dummy variables which distinguish farm credit constraint between  
inputs. If  1 = α  and  1 = δ , it implies a symmetric farm's credit constraint for both inputs. 
A farm may be more credit constrained with respect to some inputs compared to others, 
implying an asymmetry in credit constraint. For simplicity, we assume that the farm is 
credit constrained either with respect to input X ( 1 = α  and  0 = δ ) or with respect to 
input Y ( 0 = α  and  1 = δ ).  
Farm maximises profits subject to credit constraint (1) according to LaGrangean: 
(2)  ( ) C Y w X w Y w X w Y X pf Y X Y X − + − − − = Ψ δ α λ ) , (  
where  λ  is the shadow price of credit constraint. The optimal conditions for a credit 
constrained farm are as follows: 
(3)  () X X w pf λα + = 1  
(4)  () Y Y w pf λδ + = 1  
From equations (3) and (4) it follows that the marginal value product of both inputs is 
higher than the price of inputs in equilibrium if a farm is symmetrically credit constrained 
(i.e. if  1 = α ,  1 = δ  and  0 > λ ):  X X w pf >  and  Y Y w pf > , respectively. A farm could 
potentially increase its profits by increasing input use but it cannot do so because of a 
binding credit constraint. If a farm is asymmetrically credit constrained for the input X 
(i.e. if  1 = α ,  0 = δ  and  0 > λ ), then only the marginal value product of input X exceeds 
its price, while the marginal value product of input Y is equal to the own price:  X X w pf >  
and  Y Y w pf = , respectively. Reversely, if a farm is asymmetrically constrained for input 
Y (i.e. if  0 = α ,  1 = δ  and  0 > λ ), then it holds that  X X w pf =  and  Y Y w pf > . Finally, if 
the farm's credit constraint (1) is non-binding (i.e. if  0 = λ ), then in equilibrium the 
marginal value product of both inputs  is equalised with their respective prices: 
X X w pf =  and  Y Y w pf = . 
2.3 The impact of credit constraint on production   9
To establish a reference for comparative statics, we first identify the equilibrium without 
credit constraint ( 0 = λ ). This is illustrated in Figure 1. The vertical axis shows the 
quantity of input Y, whereas the horizontal axis shows the quantity of input X. The 
equilibrium farm use of inputs with non-binding credit C is determined at point D, i.e. 
where the relative marginal value product of inputs is equal to their relative market 
prices, 
* * Y X Y X w w pf pf = .
9 The equilibrium D is determined by the tangency between 
the isoquant I and the isocost curve EE. We assume that the output level given by the 
isoquant I represents the optimal farm output for the given input and output prices and 
with non-binding credit constraint. The size of credit is irrelevant in this case; the credit 
does not affect output level and farm input choices. 
Asymmetric credit constraint 
An  asymmetric credit constraint binds one input: farm is credit constrained either with 
respect to input X ( 1 = α ,  0 = δ ) or with respect to input Y ( 0 = α ,  1 = δ ). Consider a 
reduction of available farm credit from C to C1 (C1 < C). We assume that C1 makes the 
credit constraint (1) binding ( 0 1 > λ ). The binding credit C1 affects one of the farm’s 
equilibrium conditions (3) and (4), depending on which input is credit constrained. The 
asymmetric credit constraint increases the marginal value product of the constrained 
input above its market price, whereas for the unconstrained input the equality is not 
affected:  0 ) ( ) ( 1 = − > −
AS j j AS i i w C pf w C pf , for i, j = X, Y (this follows from equations 
(3) and (4)), where input i is assumed to be credit constrained.  
The impact of an asymmetric credit constraint can be decomposed into two effects: a 
scale effect and an input substitution effect. For example, consider a case when the input 
X is constrained ( 1 = α ,  0 = δ ). Relative to a situation with a non-binding credit 
constraint, less credit reduces production scale. In Figure 1 it leads to a parallel shift of 
the isocost curve from EE to EAS'EAS'. This scale effect of an asymmetric credit constraint 
shifts the equilibrium from D to F, which is the tangent point between the isocost curve 
                                                 
9 We define the notations 
* x , 
S x  and 
AS x  for equilibriums with non-binding, symmetric and 
asymmetric credit constraint, respectively.   10
EAS'EAS' and the isoquant curve IAS. The isoquant IAS is below the no-credit constraint 
isoquant I implying a lower output with than without the binding (asymmetric) credit 
constraint. Note that the lower output scale reduces the use of both inputs (
* ' X X AS <  and 
* ' Y YAS < ). 
Second, equations (3) and (4) imply that 
AS j i AS j i j i j i w w C pf C pf w w C pf C pf ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 * * λ + = < = , where input i is 
assumed to be credit constrained. What follows, an asymmetric credit constraint changes 
the relative marginal value product of inputs by the shadow price of credit constrained 
input  1 λ . In response to this, a farm substitutes the credit constrained input for a credit 
un-constrained input, because 
AS j i j i C pf C pf C pf C pf ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 * < . In Figure 1, 
facing the credit constrain C1, farm substitutes credit constrained input X for credit un-
constrained input Y along isoquant curve IAS. The isocost curve rotates from EAS'EAS' to 
EAS''EAS''. The rotation of the isocost curve is determined by the adjustment of the relative 
input prices by shadow price  1 λ  from 
* Y X w w  to 
AS Y X w w ) 1 ( 1 λ + , respectively, where 
AS Y X Y X w w w w ) 1 ( 1 * λ + < .
10 The rotation takes place until point B, which is 
determined by the credit constraint C1 fixing the use of input X at XAS
C.
11 Hence, the 
equilibrium shifts from point F to point B. The substitution effect changes the relative 





AS X X < ), whereas the use of credit un-constrained input Y increases 
(
' *'
AS AS Y Y > ) (Figure 1). What follows, as far as the constrained input X is concerned, the 
substitution effect works in the same direction as the scale effect. The opposite is true for 
the unconstrained input Y.  
In summary, an asymmetric credit constraint reduces the equilibrium output, decreases 
the credit constrained input, and may increase or decrease the credit un-constrained 
                                                 
10 The slope of the isocost EAS'EAS' is  Y X w w  and the slope of the isocost EAS''EAS'' is  Y X w w ) 1 ( 1 λ + . 
11 From equation (1) it follows that with the binding asymmetric credit constraint  X AS
C
AS w C X 1 = .   11
inputs. Farms expand the use of the credit un-constrained inputs, if the substitution effect 
is stronger than the scale effect. In the reverse case, if the substitution effect is smaller 
than the scale effect, then farms reduce the use of the credit un-constrained inputs.  
Symmetric credit constraint 
With symmetric credit constraint ( 1 = α ,  1 = δ ), a farm is equally constrained with 
respect to both inputs. Totally differentiating the FOCs (3), (4) and credit constraint (1), 
and solving for 
S dC dX , 
S dC dY  and 





















































































































































A symmetric credit constraint reduces both farm inputs and output.
12 Consider in Figure 1 
a reduction of the available credit to C2 (C2 < C1 < C). Relative to a non-biding credit 
constraint, lower credit C2 shifts the isocost curve from EE to ESES. The new equilibrium 
is at the tangency point, A, between the isocost curve ESES and the isoquant IS. A 
symmetric credit constraint does not affect the relative marginal value product of inputs: 
                                                 
12 Note that the necessary condition for a maximum for the farm profit function is that its second derivative 































.   12
S j i S j i S j i j i j i w w w w C pf C pf w w C pf C pf = + + = = = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 * * λ λ .
13 
As a result, the substitution between inputs will not occur. Only the scale effect will 
reduce farms output and input use. Compared to a situation without credit constraint 
(point D), farms use less of both inputs (
* * X X S < , 
* * Y YS < ) and produce less output 
(given by the isoquant curve IS). 
The theoretical results of our model can be summarised into two hypotheses: (i) input 
allocation and farm output are not affected by farm access to credit, if farms are not credit 
constrained; (ii) in the presence of credit constraint, the alleviation of the constraint will 
result in an increase in the farm output whereas the impact on the scale of farm inputs use 
is ambiguous. The latter hypothesis can be further decomposed into three auxiliary sub-
hypotheses: (iii) the alleviation of an asymmetric credit constraint will result in the 
increase of both the equilibrium output and the equilibrium use of the credit constrained 
inputs; (iv) the alleviation of an asymmetric credit constraint will result in the decrease of 
the equilibrium use of the credit un-constrained inputs, if the substitution effect is 
stronger than the scale effect, and vice versa; (v) the alleviation of a symmetric credit 
constraint will result in the increase of the scale of production and the equilibrium use of 
all inputs. 
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
We test the theoretical hypothesis empirically for the eight CEE transition countries. This 
faces several complications. One of the key econometric problems when estimating the 
effect of credit is selection bias, because the assignment to treatment (access to credit) is 
non-random and depends on farm characteristics. Several approaches are proposed in the 
literature to overcome this difficulty. The Heckman sample selection model provides one 
solution (Petrick, 2004). Other approaches include the use of switching regressors (Feder 
et al., 1990; Carter and Olinto, 2003). 
In this paper, we study the impact of farm access to credit on farm performance by means 
of matching methods, which serve as a nonparametric alternative to linear regressions. 
                                                 
13 In Figure 1 this implies that the initial isocost curve EE is parallel with the isocost curve ESES.   13
More precisely, we employ the propensity score matching estimator proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and further developed by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). 
The main purpose of the matching method is to mimic a controlled experiment where the 
treated group is constructed among the non-treated. In the context of the present study, 
matching estimators have two main advantages over standard estimators. First, it does not 
impose any functional-form assumption on how the access to credit affects farm 
behaviour. Accordingly, we can allow for all types of heterogeneities and non-linearities 
in the effect of credit as long as they relate to observable characteristics. Second, it allows 
us to base our analysis only on comparisons between farms similar in terms of observable 
characteristics. By doing so we avoid the potential problem of drawing inferences from 
comparing very different farms, which are likely to bias linear regression results (see, e.g. 
Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). 
Despite these advantages, due to high data demand matching methods have been scarcely 
used in agricultural economics (few examples include Dabalen et al. 2004; Bento et al., 
2007; Key and Roberts, 2008; Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). The popularity of matching 
methods for studying the impact of farm access to credit on farm performance is even 
lower (to our knowledge the only exemption is Briggeman, Towe and Morehart, 2009). 
An important advantage of the present study is the large size of the FADN farm level 
panel data, which allows us to employ the matching approach for studying the 
determinants and implications of rural credit constraints in the transition context.  
Using the same notation as in the theoretical model, C denotes an indicator for farm 
having access to credit (C=1) or no (limited) access to credit (C=0). Let Q1i be the 
potential performance of farm i with access to credit (i.e. exposed to the treatment) and 
Q0i the potential performance of farm i wit no (limited)  access to credit (i.e. not exposed 
to the treatment, control). Finally, denote a vector of observable covariates by Z. Then the 
expected casual effect of the treatment on farm i’s performance and the parameter of our 
interest would be E(Q1i – Q0i|Zi,Ci = 1). This is the ‘average treatment on the treated’ 
(ATT), which measures the effect of access to credit on outcome variable for those farms 
that actually used credit (e.g. to pre-finance the purchase of inputs) compared to what   14
would have happened if they would not have relied on credit (or they would have relied 
on other sources of finance).  
Given that we do not observe what would have happened if farms with credit would had 
been denied access to external funding (or vice versa), we construct an estimate of the 
counterfactual: E(Q0i|Zi, Ci=1). As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), comparing 
farms with similar probability of getting credit given the observables in Z is equivalent to 
comparing farms with similar values of Z. Accordingly, using a probit model a 
probability for each farm of getting credit (propensity score) is computed. Next, based on 
this propensity score, for each treated observation a counterfactual is estimated using the 
kernel matching procedure.
14 This allows us to compare each treated observation only 
with controls having similar values of observables in Z. To assure that the compared 
farms are not too different in terms of propensity score, we employ matching with 
calliper 0.01. 
Note that the adopted matching procedure relies on two critical assumptions: first, the so 
called selection on observables assumption and second, the common support assumption. 
The former assumes that the propensity score is a balancing function, i.e. conditional on 
Z, without access to credit the treated farms would behave in the same way as the control 
farms.
15 The latter assumes that the propensity score is bounded between 0 and 1. Thanks 
to this, each treated observation has its counterpart among the controls. We discuss how 
do these assumptions hold in our case below, where we motivate our choice of covariates 
to be included in Z. 
4. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
The econometric model outlined in the previous section requires data on farm credit, 
                                                 
14 1 to 1 matching estimator was also used. However, although the matching performed somewhat worse in 
terms of reducing the differences in distribution of observable covariates among treated and non-treated 
farms, the main results remained unaffected and therefore, they are not reported here but may be obtained 
by request. 
15 As noted by Heckman et al. (1997), treated and controls may still differ even after conditioning on 
observables. This may be due to unobservable characteristics. One possible solution to mitigate this 
problem is to combine matching procedure with difference-in-differences method (see for instance, Pufahl 
and Weiss, 2009). However, given that our data spans only two years and does not include information on 
timing of granting credit, this method cannot be applied in our study.   15
variables determining farm access to credit and outcome variables capturing farm 
behaviour. The main data source we use in the present study is the Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN). It covers 37,409 farms in 8 transition countries.
16 The Appendix 
presents more details about the FADN data, including the sources for each variable. 
In order to gain a detailed and robust view about the potential impact of access to credit 
on farm performance, we use six outcome variables for which we identify ATT. All of 
them are measured in EUR. Farm output is directly available in the FADN data (SE131). 
The same applies to the investment variable. which captures gross investment on fixed 
assets (SE516). Variable costs are calculated by summing up the total specific costs 
(SE281), total farming overheads (SE336), and wages paid (SE370). Labour and land use 
are directly available in the FADN data (SE010 and SE025, respectively). We normalise 
all cost variables – the gross investment, variable costs, land and labour – by output. 
Finally, based on the FADN data, we use the Total Factor Productivity estimates based 
on the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator as the sixth outcome variable. 
The dependent variable in the probit model – farm credit – is constructed from the FADN 
variable total farm loans (liabilities) (SE485), which we normalise by farm output 
(SE131). We use a dummy variable to determine whether or not the farm has the 
normalised liabilities greater than zero.
17 Note that we observe solely the farm usage of 
credit, but not the (potential) availability of getting credit (i.e. whether a farm is credit 
constraint or not), as information about the latter is not available in our data set. 
Nevertheless, testing the theoretical hypotheses derived above allows us also to indirectly 
investigate the impact of credit constraint. This is possible thanks to exploiting the 
relationship between farm access to credit and different inputs’ use as well as 
investigating the relationship between farm access to credit and farm output.  
As noted by Briggeman, Towe and Morehart (2009), the impact of credit constraint may 
be non-linear. In order to estimate the impact of different levels of credit constraints, in 
                                                 
16 At the end, after cleaning the data from outliers, our analysis is based on 34,169 observations. 
17 We also investigate other specifications where the treatment is defined over the relative size of credit. In 
that case a dummy dependent variable equals to one if the normalised liabilities are greater than a given 
threshold (see further).   16
addition to identifying the treatment effect of using credit, we also estimate the treatment 
effect of heterogeneous intensities of credit reliance. For this purpose, we split the whole 
sample into 8 credit groups.
18 Group 1 contains farms with zero credit.
19 Group 2 
contains farms with small credits, up to 10% of output. Groups from 3 to 7 contain farms 
with gradually increasing credit-output ratio ranging from 11% to 100% of output. 
Finally, group 8 represents farms with the largest loans (over 100% of the output). Table 
1 presents our sample broken down by these credit size classes. The matching is done to 
obtain the following comparisons: group 2 vs group 1, group 3 vs group 2, group 4 vs 
group 3, group 5 vs group 4, group 6 vs group 5, group 7 vs group 6, and group 8 vs 
group 7. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As regards the choice of covariates that enter the estimation of the propensity score, it is 
crucial for several reasons (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). First, any omitted variable 
uncorrelated with Z that affects both the access to credit and its impact on farm behaviour 
may result in violating the selection on observables assumption. Second, including too 
many covariates may lead to a situation, where the common support assumption would 
not hold, since we will predict the treatment status too well. In order to trade off these 
two opposing concerns, we decided to select a limited number of covariates. Although 
such decision is always arbitrary, we believe to capture the main factors that would affect 
both the access to credit and farm behaviour (our outcome variables). According to the 
theoretical framework and the existing literature, we include the following covariates.  
The first covariate in matrix Z is subsidies, which captures differences in farms’ liquidity. 
                                                 
18 The division of farms into these 8 groups was done so as to satisfy the condition that the number of 
treated observations should be smaller than the number of controls. We have also tested the model for more 
than 8 farm groups. The results are consistent with those reported in the paper. However, the statistical 
power decreases, because the number of observations per group is lower thus reducing the model’s 
predictability. The matching estimator requires relatively large number of observations, as each treated 
needs to have its counterfactual among the non-treated. Moreover, note that imposing the common support 
assumption is likely to result in dropping some observations for which the treatment status is predicted too 
well (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). This in turn, may render using matching procedure with a small 
sample rather difficult. In that case the loss of efficiency of the estimates (as compared to the parametric 
ones) may be non-negligible. 
19 Note that this does not imply that farms in this group were denied credit.   17
The subsidy variable is directly available in the FADN data (SE605) and measures all 
payments that farms may get on number of accounts. Following the existing literature, we 
normalise the subsidy variable by output.  
Second, there is a large variation in our sample in the use of own land and labour between 
farms. Some farms rent large share of the utilised land whereas others cultivate only own 
land. Similarly, some farms use mainly hired labour, whereas others rely only on family 
workforce. To control for this source of heterogeneity, in the probit regression we include 
two factor ownership variables: share of land owned and share of hired labour. The 
former measures the ratio of owned land in total land endowment. The latter represents 
the share of hired labour in the total farm labour.  
Third, since farm access to credit often depends on farms’ ability to provide collateral, we 
condition farm credit on the total fixed owned assets. This variable is constructed by 
subtracting long and medium-term loans (SE490) from the total fixed assets (SE441). As 
above, we normalise the total own fixed assets by farm output.  
Moreover, according to Briggeman, Towe and Morehart (2009), it is reasonable to 
assume that farm access to credit and farms’ investment decisions (input use) may be 
determined by its size and general economic performance. In order to control for this 
source of heterogeneity, we also include a covariate economic size, which represents the 
economic size of farms measured in European Size Units (ESU) (SE005).  
In addition to the described explanatory variables, in the first stage regressions we also 
include dummy variables to control for time dimension, sector and geographical location. 
All dummy variables are directly available from the FADN data: time dummy (year), 
sector (A8) and region dummy (A2).
20 
Finally, findings of Bezemer (2002); Petrick and Latruffe (2003); and Davis et al., (2003) 
suggest that the effects of credit are heterogeneous across countries. For example, 
                                                 
20 In addition, we experiment also with lagged debt asset ratio as an explanatory variable. Although it 
improved the prediction power of our first-stage probit models it did not affect the results of our second 
stage treatment effect estimations. Moreover, it limited our sample only to farms with observations for two 
points in time which had detrimental effect on balancing properties of our matching procedure. Therefore, 
for brevity reasons we do not report these results here.   18
countries with higher land fragmentation are particularly prone to suffer from the credit 
constraint problem. Therefore, in addition to pooled estimations (8 countries), we also 
examine each country separately (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland).
21 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
5.1 Matching 
The quality of the matching depends on the extent to which the propensity score is a truly 
balancing function. Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview about the 
distribution of selected covariates across the treated and control farms for the pooled 
sample.
22 Three key points are worth to note. First, before imposing the common support 
assumption (columns (1) and (2)) the treated and control farms differ significantly for 
most variables used to calculate the propensity score (irrespectively of which credit size 
classes we compare). These differences are removed with matching (columns (3) and (4)) 
which should be recognised as a second important observation. Only in the comparison 
between credit size 2 and credit size 1 the variables assets fixed owned, economic size 
and a time dummy retain a different distribution in the treated and control farms. This 
suggests that these covariates should be included among the explanatory variables that we 
use for the propensity score estimation. With this caveat in mind, we conclude that 
matching of treated and non-treated farms performed well and is valid for meaningful 
comparisons.  
Third, for the vast majority of probit regressions (not shown) the pseudo R
2 is relatively 
low (ranging from 0.08 to 0.15),
23 suggesting that the covariates used leave a lot of 
                                                 
21 Slovenia and Slovakia were dropped due to insufficient number of observations for given size classes. 
22 Due to a large number of comparisons made, results of tests showing how well did the propensity score 
as a balancing function for the country sub-samples are not reported here. However, they might be obtained 
from authors upon request. Balancing properties were fulfilled in 3 out of 7 cases for Latvia, 5 out of 7 
cases for Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania and 6 out of 7 cases for Poland. 
23 This concerned especially regressions predicting transitions between groups of farms with credit-output 
ratio larger than zero. Somewhat better predictions were obtained for transitions between credit groups 2 
and 1, i.e. between farms having no credit at all and farms having credit not exceeding 10% of the 
production value (pseudo R
2 ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 depending on (sub-)sample used).   19
residual variation unexplained. One may argue, therefore, that the included covariates do 
not accurately predict the state of being granted a (higher) credit. This is presumably due 
to the fact that our dataset does not contain any information about individual 
characteristics of farmers (e.g. age, education, having a successor etc.), informal 
institutions or social norms (e.g., relatives or friends between lenders and credit takers), 
which however are important for making the decisions about (not) granting a credit to a 
farm. However, the objective of this study is not to specify a statistical model explaining 
farm access to credit in the best possible way. Having probit regressions with large 
prediction power would lead to a much smaller number of treated farms meeting the 
common support assumption. This is especially important for country sub-samples, where 
the number of observations per credit size group is relatively small (sometimes around 
200). Moreover, also other empirical studies employing matching estimators for studying 
farm access to credit report low pseudo R
2 (e.g. Briggeman, Towe and Morehart (2009) 
report pseudo R
2 equal to 0.31). 
Bearing these limitations in mind, we conclude that the balancing property of our 
matching is both statistically and economically satisfactory and it is justifiable to estimate 
the treatment effect of farm access to credit according to the econometric strategy 
outlined above.  
5.2 Pooled sample 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results for the pooled sample in absolute values and in 
percentages, respectively. Each column refers to a different output variable. All 
estimators are based on kernel matching and the reported numbers should read as 
follows: positive (negative) numbers refer to increase (decrease) in output variable for 
farms in the treated group compared to farms in the control group
24. For example, the 
results for investments shown in column 3 of Table 3 (Table 2) indicate that farms in 
credit class 2 have 29.04% more investments per 1000 EUR of additional credit (higher 
normalised investments by 0.086) than farms in credit class 1.   
                                                 
24 To facilitate the reading of Tables 2-9, the treated group is indicated in bold.   20
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Several conclusions can be drawn based on these results. First, no statistically significant 
impact of credit on the value of production was found (column 1). Although the results 
suggest that farm access to (higher) credit positively affects the value of production in all 
except the two highest credit-per-output groups, the precision of the obtained estimates is 
too low to render them significantly different from zero.
25 Second, the obtained results 
suggest that farm access to (higher) credit has a positive impact on the total factor 
productivity. The increase in the TFP between credit classes ranges between 0.07% and 
1.87% per 1000 EUR of additional credit with the largest gain in productivity being for 
low level of credit (Table 3). This indicates a decrease in the marginal productivity per 
additional credit. This result is consistent with the estimates reported in column 3, 
suggesting that access to credit increases the level of relative investments, which should 
be recognised as a third important observation. The increase in investment is significant 
for most of the credit group comparisons ranging between 0.14% and 29.04% per 1000 
EUR of additional credit (Table 3). Interestingly, no impact on the relative land 
endowments was found (column 4). Furthermore, our results suggest that credit has a 
positive effect on the use of variable inputs (between 0.01%, and 2.34% per 1000 EUR of 
additional credit, Table 3). Finally, a negative impact of access to credit on the use of 
labour was found (between -0.14%, and -1.64% per 1000 EUR of additional credit, Table 
3). This can be explained by the fact that through credit farms mainly finance capital 
equipment, which usually is labour saving. The negative relationship between farm 
access to credit and labour use is reversed for the two highest credit/output ratio groups 
(by 0.02% per 1000 EUR of additional credit, Table 3). This indicates that labour is being 
substituted by capital up to a point, where more investment ultimately reduces such 
possibility.  
It is important now to collate these findings with the theoretical hypotheses mentioned 
above. Recall that the model developed in section 2 predicts that in the presence of credit 
constraint, an access to external funding should result in positive impact on farm output 
                                                 
25 However, given that semi-parametric methods trade off reduced bias due to specification error against 
less efficiency, this result is not that surprising.   21
and the scale of inputs’ use. The exact adjustment pattern depends on whether the 
constraint is symmetric or not. Overall, the obtained results suggest that farms are 
asymmetrically credit constrained. Farms tend to be credit constrained with respect to 
investments and variable inputs, but credit unconstrained with respect to land and labour. 
For labour the results indicate that substitution effect tends to be stronger than the scale 
effect (particularly for low credit classes) leading to a substitution of labour for credit 
constrained investments and variable inputs. For land the substitution effect tends to 
offset the scale effect resulting in no impact of credit on land use. The change in the 
relative input intensities is further highlighted by the positive impact of an improved 
access to credit on farm productivity.  
5.3 Country level analysis 
In order to gain more country-specific insights, we examine how these patterns differ 
across the CEE transition countries. The obtained estimates of treatment effects based on 
country sub-samples are presented in Tables 4-9. Generally, country specific results 
complement our findings based on a pooled sample. First, we observe robust evidence on 
the positive and significant impact of access to credit on investment. Second, no single 
evidence was found that the credit constraint would influence farm’s land use. This result 
again suggests that farms in the CEE are not credit constrained with respect to land. 
Third, except for the two groups with the highest credit-output ratio, farm access to credit 
has a negative impact on labour use.  As noted above, this can be explained by the fact 
that through credit farms mainly finance capital equipment, which usually is labour 
saving. Fourth, an interesting pattern emerges with respect to farm productivity. The 
obtained estimates suggest a statistically significant increase in TFP in three our sample 
countries: Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. These results are interesting, because these 
three countries are those with the highest share of small individual farms. This, in turn, 
indicates that credit constraint might be more problematic for small individual farms 
compared to large corporate farms. Moreover, in these three countries a significantly 
positive impact of farm access to credit on output could be observed. Fifth, at the country 
level the pattern of credit’s impact on variable inputs is much less clear than in the pooled 
sample, which might be due to sizeable cross-country differences in farm structure. On   22
the one hand, for all countries having small credits, the use of variable inputs increases 
significantly. On the other hand, for other credit size groups the estimates are much less 
stable and statistically insignificant from zero.  
TABLES 4-9 ABOUT HERE 
In summary, the country level estimates are largely consistent with the pooled sample 
results. Farms tend to be asymmetrically credit constrained. The statistical significance 
level is smaller for the country level results than for pooled sample, as the sample size is 
considerably smaller.  
5.4 Limitations 
Although, the FADN data is the largest, most comprehensive and harmonised farm level 
data set for the whole EU, in the context of the present study it suffers from several 
issues.  While it allows us to control for a number of determinants of farm access to 
credit, we are unable to include in our analysis three important aspects that may affect the 
availability of external funding, namely general institutional environment, contracting 
and rural informal lending mechanisms. In effect, our analysis may suffer from 
unobserved heterogeneity problem. There are however three points that seem to mitigate 
this concern. First, we include sectoral and geographical dummies to capture at least part 
of the effect of the abovementioned omitted variables. Second, it seems reasonable to 
assume that socio-economic characteristics tend to cluster across regions. This in turn, 
would suggest that unobserved differences between farms could correlate with observed 
differences. Third, as noted by Frölich (2006) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2009) 
matching can cope with endogeneity of Z as long as these covariates are not determined 
by the regressor of interest (in our case farm access to credit). Obviously, whether this is 
the case in practice is an empirical matter. It seems, however, reasonable to assume that 
in our case observable characteristics are not endogenously affected by farms’ prospects 
about treatment.
26  
                                                 
26 Although the share of land owned, economic farm size or fixed owned assets surely depend on the level 
of external funding, it is less likely that farms would be able to adjust them to affect the future prospects of 
getting credit.   23
Not all alternative sources of pre-financing input use have been captured in the present 
study due unavailability of data on contracting and rural informal lending mechanism. 
Because loans are not the only source of financing to farms, some farms that report zero 
loans may actually not be credit constrained if they can obtain sufficient financing 
through other channels.  For this reason, our estimates of the impact of the access to 
credit (credit constraint) on farm behaviour may be biased downward (upward) if farm 
access to loans is negatively (positively) correlated with farm access to other sources of 
finance. Our estimates are accurate, if loans and other sources of finance are uncorrelated 
with each other. The abovementioned caveats should be kept in mind while interpreting 
the presented results.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper studies the impact of credit constraint on farm behaviour in the CEE 
transition countries. The theoretical model suggests that, in the presence of a binding 
credit constraint, an improved access to credit may lead to productivity increase, farm 
output and the use of inputs. With symmetric credit constraint, the alleviation of farm 
credit constraint increases the use of all inputs. However, if farms are asymmetrically 
credit constrained, then the improved access to credit may lead to substitution of credit-
constrained inputs to credit-unconstrained inputs. 
The empirical results for the CEE suggest that farms are credit constrained. Access to 
credit increases TFP up to 1.9% per 1000 EUR of additional credit. However, our 
estimates indicate that farms are asymmetrically credit constrained. Farms in the CEE are 
particularly credit constrained with respect to variable inputs and capital investments, as 
variable inputs and capital investments increase up to 2.3% and 29%, respectively, per 
1000 EUR of additional credit. On the other hand, land and labour are not credit 
constrained. This could be due to the relatively high land abundance and high agricultural 
labour employment in the CEE transition countries, particularly in Poland, Slovenia and 
the Baltic states. An alternative explanation could be that farms are able to better cope 
with financing issues of land and labour compared to variable inputs and investments. 
Family farms use mainly own labour in production, which reduces the need for pre-  24
financing. Family labour can address credit problem by postponing household 
consumption to a latter period, when the revenue from the production sales is collected 
(after the harvest at the end of the season). Similar holds for land. Farms can increase 
land use through rental markets. Rental markets are relatively important in transition 
countries with more than 50% of land being rented (Ciaian and Kancs, 2009). 
Additionally, in most cases rents are paid at the end of the season, which further reduces 
the pre-financing needs for land (Ciaian and Kancs, 2009). Furthermore, (own) land 
serves as a good collateral and therefore, this is an additional factor which may reduce 
farms’ credit constraint on land. 
An important factor, which may reduce farm capital constraint for variable inputs and 
investments, are CAP subsidies as well as vertical contracting with processors and/or 
traders. Even though both CAP subsidies and contracting have increased in recent years, 
our results indicate that they were unable to fully eliminate farm credit problems in the 
CEE transition economies. Investigating these two issues in more details may constitute a 
potentially fruitful line of research that would importantly extend the presented work.  
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Table 1. Definition and summary of credit groups 
Credit group  Credit / output, %  No observations 
1 0  10832 
2 0-10  4406 
3 10-20  4147 
4 20-30  3976 
5 30-45  3853 
6 45-70  3687 
7 70-100  3377 
8 >100  3131 
Note: Group 1 captures farms with zero credit, group 8 represents farms with the largest credit/output ratio. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the FADN data.  
Table 2.  Credit and farm behaviour: Matching estimates of the effect of accessing 






























2 vs. 1  5186    0.057  ***  0.086 ***  0.005   0.116  ***  -0.031 ***
t-stat  1.18    9.30    26.97   0.59 24.36    -5.97  
3 vs. 2  5613    0.027  ***  0.006   -0.006   0.011  **  -0.006 * 
t-stat  1.06    5.41    1.40   -0.76 2.48    -1.82  
4 vs. 3  7131    0.035  ***  0.024 ***  -0.004   0.0005    -0.016 ***
t-stat  1.15    6.55    4.98   -0.61 0.13    -4.91  
5 vs. 4  8586    0.031  ***  0.028 ***  -0.005   0.003    -0.010 ***
t-stat  1.12    5.23    4.91   -0.72 0.68    -3.31  
6 vs. 5  3746    0.022  ***  0.059 ***  -0.007   0.005    -0.002  
t-stat  0.40    3.44    8.70   -0.87 1.13    -0.80  
7 vs. 6  -2864    0.009    0.059 ***  -0.002   0.010  *  0.001  
t-stat  -0.29    1.31    6.75   -0.27 1.84    0.37  
8 vs. 7  -7179    -0.014    0.128 ***  0.0009   0.016  **  0.009 ** 
t-stat  -0.73    -1.53    9.56   0.09 2.53    2.30
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively    30
Table 3. Percentage change of productivity and use of inputs per 1000 EUR of 
additional credit – Pooled sample (%/EUR credit) 
   Output  TFP  Investment  Land  Variable inputs  Labour 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
2 vs 1  1.87  1.87***  29.04***  0.12  2.34***  -1.64*** 
3 vs 2  0.36  0.31***  0.56  -0.05  0.05**  -0.20* 
4 vs 3  0.03  0.25***  0.62***  0.00  0.00  -0.31*** 
5 vs 4  0.00  0.14***  0.41***  0.00  0.00  -0.14*** 
6 vs 5  0.0  0.07***  0.44***  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 
7 vs 6  -0.03  0.02  0.21***  0.00  0.01*  0.02 
8 vs 7  -0.03  0.00  0.14***  0.00  0.01**  0.02** 
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively   31
Table 4.  Credit and farm behaviour: CZECH REPUBLIC 
 Output  TFP  Investments Land Variable 
inputs 
Labour 
2 vs 1  7164   0.020  0.066 ***  -0.040 0.155 ***  -0.011   
t-stat  0.65  0.68  8.69   -0.79 5.56   -1.03   
3 vs 2  22660   -0.0001  0.030 *  -0.009 0.018   -0.011  ** 
t-stat  0.89  -0.01  1.80   -0.30 0.95   -2.53   
4 vs 3  13932   0.003  0.003   -0.020 -0.0004   -0.004   
t-stat  0.20  0.12  0.13   -0.49 -0.01   -0.80   
5 vs 4  60068   0.023  0.029   .0144 0.005   -0.004   
t-stat  0.77  1.02  1.58   -0.50 0.22   -1.11   
6 vs 5  -33244   0.002  0.037 **  0.002 0.025   0.005  * 
t-stat  -0.44  0.11  1.98   0.13 1.35   1.65   
7 vs 6  -20499   0.012  0.031   -0.001 -0.013   -0.003   
t-stat  -0.31  0.70  1.30   -0.10 -0.80   -1.30   
8 vs 7  -21002   0.023  0.027   -0.006 0.025   0.007  ** 
t-stat  -0.30  1.10  0.72   -0.29 1.16   2.14   
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
 
 
Table 5.  Credit and farm behaviour: ESTONIA 
   Output  TFP  Investments Land Variable 
inputs 
Labour 
2 vs 1  1642   0.013  0.074 ***  -0.005 0.153 ***  -0.015 
t-stat  0.53   0.30  6.26   -0.10 4.53   -0.51 
3 vs 2  -25352   0.005  0.002   0.015 0.017   0.005 
t-stat  -1.04   0.14  0.12   0.30 0.57   0.23 
4 vs 3  13698   0.022  0.060 **  0.015 -0.004   -0.009 
t-stat  0.33   0.52  2.44   0.29 -0.14   -0.41 
5 vs 4  10230   0.002  0.047 *  0.002 0.012   -0.004 
t-stat  0.26   0.06  1.78   0.05 0.51   -0.35 
6 vs 5  5929   0.068  * 0.071 **  0.0005 -0.033   0.009 
t-stat  0.19   1.83  2.02   0.01 -1.24   0.68 
7 vs 6  -275   -0.002  0.129 ***  -0.016 0.038   0.006 
t-stat  -0.01   -0.07  2.69   -0.38 1.45   0.36 
8 vs 7  -10496   -0.06  0.206 ***  0.020 0.017   0.015 
t-stat  -0.23   -1.18  2.57   0.39 0.48   0.62 
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
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Table 6.  Credit and farm behaviour: HUNGARY 
   Output  TFP  Investments Land Variable 
inputs 
Labour 
2 vs 1  -104   0.074  ***  0.039 -0.007 0.086 ***  -0.011   
t-stat  -0.02   2.57    3.66 -0.15 3.13   -0.63   
3 vs 2  20825 **  0.091  ***  0.018 -0.004 -0.031 *  -0.010  * 
t-stat  2.36   4.58    1.40 -0.13 -1.83   -1.71   
4 vs 3  11824   0.042  **  0.005 -0.002 0.008   0.001   
t-stat  0.49   1.97    0.39 -0.08 0.47   0.29   
5 vs 4  10825   0.050  **  0.023 0.016 -0.023   -0.008   
t-stat  0.38   2.45    1.77 0.52 -1.32   -1.39 
6 vs 5  1308   0.0007    0.038 0.01 0.007   0.006 
t-stat  0.04   0.04    2.82 0.40 0.52   1.36 
7 vs 6  -13498   0.034  *  0.036 0.01 0.0006   -0.002 
t-stat  -0.44   1.86    2.09 0.41 0.05   -0.54 
8 vs 7  3189   -0.038  **  0.152 0.001 0.029 *  0.004 
t-stat  0.12   -1.97    5.80 0.06 1.89   0.83 
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
 
Table 7.  Credit and farm behaviour: LITHUANIA 
 Output  TFP  Investments Land Variableinputs  Labour 
2 vs 1  9777  **  0.066  ***  0.123 ***  0.028 0.106 ***  -0.04  *** 
t-stat  2.08    3.41    9.30   0.95 7.40   -3.10   
3 vs 2  4611    0.036  *  0.031   0.008 0.0127   0.019  * 
t-stat  0.43    1.88    1.49   -0.33 0.84   -1.94   
4 vs 3  -5921    0.044  *  -
0.004  0.002 -0.001   -0.009   
t-stat  -0.36    1.90    -0.19   0.07 -0.08   -1.12   
5 vs 4  1046    0.039  0.068 ***  0.001 0.004   -0.0001   
t-stat  0.06    1.51  2.65   0.05 0.29   -0.02   
6 vs 5  -5003    0.015  0.144 ***  0.0008 0.0127   0.001   
t-stat  -0.18    0.55  3.95   0.03 0.68   0.15   
7 vs 6  872    -
0.012  0.092 ** -0.002 0.022   -0.014  * 
t-stat  0.04    -0.41  2.09   -0.09 1.12   -1.79   
8 vs 7  -9751    -
0.055  0.327 *** 0.0007 0.039   0.023  * 
t-stat  -0.56    -1.42  5.00 0.02 1.62   1.66 
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
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Table 8.  Credit and farm behaviour: LATVIA 
 Output  Tfp  Investments  Land  Variable 
inputs  Labour 
2 vs 1  10385  ***  0.017    0.128 ***  0.021 0.141   -0.026 
t-stat  3.16    0.46    7.91   0.52 5.45   -0.86 
3 vs 2  -12669    0.035    0.052   0.001 -0.012   -0.020 
t-stat  -0.48    1.00    1.58   0.03 -0.47   -1.01 
4 vs 3  23078    0.028    0.007   0.0009 -0.018   -0.026 
t-stat  0.55    0.76    0.18   0.02 -0.70   -1.42 
5 vs 4  10145    0.014    0.021   -0.023 -0.003   -0.002 
t-stat  0.23    0.45    0.58   -0.54 -0.13   -0.16 
6 vs 5  -10943    -0.001    0.080 **  -0.014 0.017   -0.015 
t-stat  -0.27    -0.05    2.10   -0.36 0.80   -0.92 
7 vs 6  -51271    -0.035    0.151 ***  -0.005 0.004   0.002 
t-stat  -1.01    -0.95    3.48   -0.15 0.18   0.18 
8 vs 7  19598    0.013    0.271 ***  0.015 0.025   -0.006 
t-stat  0.57    0.30    3.95   0.34 0.89   -0.48 
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
 
Table 9.  Credit and farm behaviour: POLAND 
 Output  TFP  Investments Land  Variable 
inputs  Labour 
2 vs 1  9492  ***  0.066  ***  0.066 ***  0.0001 0.097 ***  -0.035  *** 
t-stat  5.47    13.55    19.90   0.02 27.56   -8.12   
3 vs 2  2419    0.025  ***  -0.001   -0.005 0.014 ***  -0.003   
t-stat  1.10    4.52    -0.34   -0.79 3.48   -0.74   
4 vs 3  4648  *  0.038  ***  0.024 ***  0.001 -0.001   0.015  *** 
t-stat  1.70    6.61    4.35   -0.21 -0.32   -3.70   
5 vs 4  -133    0.035  ***  0.024 ***  -0.002 0.0006   -0.009  ** 
t-stat  -0.04    5.25    3.63   -0.31 0.15   -2.48   
6 vs 5  4190    0.033  ***  0.057 ***  -0.002 -0.003   -0.003   
t-stat  1.12    4.43    6.73   -0.34 -0.68   -0.85   
7 vs 6  -1565    0.015  *  0.055 ***  -0.0005 0.009 *  0.003   
t-stat  -0.40    1.75    4.91   -0.06 1.72   0.80   
8 vs 7  -5619    -0.001  0.114 ***  0.005 0.007   0.016  *** 
t-stat  -1.62    -0.12  6.46 0.50 1.08   2.78   
Source: Authors’ estimations. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively   34
APPENDIX 
Data 
The main source of data we use in the empirical analysis comes from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) compiled and maintained by the European 
Commission. The FADN is a European system of sample surveys that take place each 
year and collect structural and accountancy data on the farms. In total there is information 
about 150 variables on farm structure and yield, output, costs, subsidies and taxes, 
income, balance sheet, and financial indicators. The yearly FADN sample covers 
approximately 18,700 agricultural farms in the eight NMS. In 2004 they represented a 
population of almost 1,000,000 farms in the seven NMS, covering approximately 90% of 
the total utilised agricultural area and accounting for more than 90% of the total 
agricultural production. The aggregate FADN data are publicly available. However, 
farm-level data are confidential and, for the purposes of this study, accessed under a 
special agreement.  
To our knowledge, the FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is 
harmonised (the bookkeeping principles are the same across all EU Member States) and 
is representative of the commercial agricultural holdings in the EU. Holdings are selected 
to take part in the survey on the basis of sampling plans established at the level of each 
region in the EU. The survey does not, however, cover all the agricultural holdings in the 
Union (universe defined by Community surveys on the structure of agricultural holdings), 
but only those which are of a size allowing them to rank as commercial holdings. 
In the present study we use a sub-sample, which covers the eight NMS from the CEE. 
From the FADN data for two years (2004 and 2005) we create a panel of farming 
operations. For each year the FADN contains information of approximately 18,700 farms. 
Although, the total number of farms is roughly equal over the two years, this masks a 
great deal of turnover. The unbalanced panel contains 37,409 observations. 
 
   35
Table A1. Means of selected covariates across treated and control farms (pooled sample).  
  Credit classes: treated vs. control 2 vs. 1    Credit classes: treated vs. control 3 vs. 2    Credit classes: treated vs. control 4 vs. 3 
  Before matching  After matching    Before matching  After matching    Before matching  After matching 
























Land owned  0.629  0.771 
a 0.629  0.623    0.678  0.628
a  0.679 0.685   0.660 0.678
a 0.661  0.666 
Asset fixed owned  2.598  3.714
a 2.599  2.515
a   2.722  2.599
a  2.723 2.713   2.605 2.722
a 2.609  2.616 
Subsidies 0.181  0.214
a 0.181  0.178    0.176  0.181
a  0.176 0.171   0.178 0.176 0.178 0.176 
Labour hired  0.138  0.074
a 0.137  0.145    0.163  0.138
a  0.161 0.152   0.201 0.163
a 0.200  0.192 
Farm size  32.304  17.226
a 32.167  37.037
a   39.796  32.520
a  37.727 35.228   47.962 39.796
a 47.513  45.393 
Time dummy  1.446  1.541
a 1.446  1.406
a   1.458  1.446  1.458  1.450   1.482  1.458
a 1.483  1.478 
                  
  Credit classes: treated vs. control 5 vs. 4    Credit classes: treated vs. control 6 vs. 5    Credit classes: treated vs. control 7 vs. 6 
  Before matching  After matching    Before matching  After matching    Before matching  After matching 
























Land owned  0.635  0.660
a 0.635  0.641    0.601  0.636
a  0.602 0.609   0.584 0.601 0.585 0.588 
Asset fixed owned  2.429  2.605
a  2.430 2.438   2.349 2.423 2.353 2.366   2.339 2.349 2.343 2.350 
Subsidies  0.181 0.178 0.181 0.179   0.192 0.181
a  0.192 0.188   0.212 0.192
a 0.211  0.208 
Labour hired 0.240 0.201
a 0.239 0.232 0.271 0.239
a 0.270 0.261 0.292 0.271
a 0.292 0.286
Farm size  63.85  47.962
a 63.026  59.746    76.059  63.612
a  75.862 72.884   76.888 76.068 77.010 76.283 
Time  dummy  1.489 1.482 1.489 1.490   1.496 1.489 1.495 1.498   1.512 1.496 1.510 1.508 
                  
  Credit classes: treated vs. control 8 vs. 7              
  Before matching  After matching              








            
Land  owned  0.598  0.585  0.600  0.599              
Asset fixed owned  2.693  2.341
a  2.660  2.652              
Subsidies 0.257  0.211
a  0.254  0.254              
Labour  hired  0.295  0.292  0.292  0.289              
Farm size  59.559  76.978
a  59.946  59.58              
Time  dummy  1.528  1.511  1.528  1.530              
aSignificantly different means between observations from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) control group in a t-test for 
equality of means at the 5 per cent level. 